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Germany and the United States are generally seen as the two competing systems of corporate
governance. In search for a comparative welfare analysis of the financial systems, we are
interested in (i) the aggregate value-added of corporate investments in the two countries and in
(ii) the interaction of investment and financing decisions. This paper investigates the impact of
financing, investment, and dividend decisions on the value of stock corporations in Germany
and the US. The methodology is based on a cross-sectional approach proposed by Fama and
French. In general, the evidence shows that relations for the German firms are statistically
similar to those found for their US counterparts. In both countries, corporate investment
creates value in excess of cost, but the US industrial sector seems to be more efficient in
making value-enhancing investments. Robust statistical methods are applied to verify the
results. They do not change the main conclusions.
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0. Introduction: Financial Systems and Corporate Governance
When Modigliani and Miller (1958) made their famous proposition about the
separability of corporate financing and investment decisions, they assumed the
existence of perfect capital markets. However, markets are not perfect in a neoclassical
sense. Thus, the relation between a firm’s financing decisions and its value is
influenced by asymmetric information, agency costs, and organizational structure. The
finance profession, having considered these issues,1 now starts to discover the
important impact of the financial system which firms operate in on corporate
governance.
Germany and the United States can be seen as the two “polar extremes” of
financial systems (Allen/Gale, 1995). In a so-called bank-oriented financial system,
such as Germany’s, financial intermediation and idiosyncratic long-term-relationships
are said to determine the investment behavior of firms. The German financial system is
characterized by industrial cross-holdings, banks being both debt and equityholders
and concentrated private equity ownership (Franks/Mayer, 1993; Spremann, 1994). No
active market for corporate control exists that disciplines managers and boards of
companies as is the case in the US or the UK – the so-called market-based systems.
Though the disciplining role of hostile takeovers, mergers, proxy fights, etc. is not
unanimously regarded as beneficial -- even in the US --, a lot of empirical work
supports the benefits of an “open market” for corporate control.2
In light of the obvious economic impact of different financial systems on value
creation, the question is: What determines the success or failure of a financial system
to support a sufficient level and adequate kind of corporate investment activity and
how can this level be measured?
The conventional view on Germany is that financial intermediaries3 and
interlocking directorships provide sufficient corporate control and managerial
                                               
1 Beginning with Jensen and Meckling (1976).
2 Prominent examples are Jensen/Ruback (1983), Martin/McConnell (1993), Agrawal/Walkling (1994).
Shleifer/Summers (1988) and Krugman (1994) criticize the market for corporate control for breaking up
implicit contracts with stakeholders.
3 The use of the term financial intermediary in this context refers not only to banks. Financial intermediation
can also be exercised by large shareholders in the sense of Schleifer/Vishny (1986).
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incentives, even in the absence of active capital markets.4 Some empirical studies also
suggest that -- on average -- German companies do not perform worse, if not better,
than their Anglo-Saxon counterparts.5 Colin Mayer (1988, p. 1176) finds that “What
might be deemed to be rather primitive bank dominated systems in France, Germany,
and Japan have supported substantially higher funding activity than either the UK or
USA.“ An empirical study by Michael Porter (1992) claims that US firms underinvest
because they overemphasize short-term results, causing a decline in their
competitiveness relative to German ones. However, his inferiority hypothesis is heavily
criticized by other economists.6 Yanelle (1988), von Thadden (1991), and other
economists present theoretical models that show how in bank-oriented financial
systems intermediation can lengthen the investment horizon of firms, leading to
superior project selection.
Another view is presented by Allen and Gale (1993, 1995). Comparing the
welfare effects of the German and US financial systems, they find that both have
benefits and disadvantages.7 With respect to corporate control and management
incentives they argue that bank-based systems are more suited to traditional industries
characterized by consensus about the right corporate policies. Market systems, on the
other hand, provide incentives for a wide range of people to check managerial actions
and are thus more suited to dynamic industries where consensus is lacking.8 Allen and
Gale also show that competition from financial markets can cause the benefits of the
intermediation mechanism to unravel.
There are remarkably few empirical studies that investigate the relations
between capital structure, investments, and firm performance in Germany.9 Even more
surprisingly, there are almost no studies comparing German to US data on leverage,
                                               
4 See, for example, Hellwig (1990), or Mayer (1990). Edwards and Fischer (1994) have a more critical position.
5 For example, Stehle/Hartmond (1991) address this question by calculating average annual returns of all stocks
traded on the Frankfurt stock exchange for the period 1968-86. They find that returns on German stocks are
sufficiently high when compared to returns on international stocks.
6 See, for example, Kaplan (1994), Allen/Gale (1993, 1995).
7 Space does not permit to summarize their excellent analysis. The essence of their argument is that
intermediaries can provide intertemporal forms of risk sharing that are too expensive to hedge through the
market, while financial markets provide superior opportunities for cross-sectional risk-sharing.
8 They call this “diversity of opinion”.
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dividends, investments, and the market value added of firms. One exception is the
study by Kaplan (1994) which finds that poor stock performance and negative earnings
increase the likelihood of management turnover in Germany. He interprets this as
evidence that the German corporate governance system does not ignore short-term
performance because it penalizes bad managers in a similar way the US financial
system does. Thus, he concludes that the two systems are not all that different.
However, he focuses merely on executive turnover, and his results are likely to be
driven by the obvious correlation between bad earnings and negative stock market
reactions which exists regardless of the financial system.
In an attempt to fill the gap of papers comparing the welfare effects of different
financial systems, this study investigates finance and investment patterns in Germany
and the US. It is organized as follows: Section 1 formulates the hypotheses. Section 2
describes the data and the selection of the final sample. Section 3 explains the Fama-
French cross-section regression approach to measuring the relations between value and
financing decisions. Summary statistics in Section 4 examine the means and the
correlations of the regression variables. The regression results are in Section 5. Robust
statistical regression results are presented in Section 6. Section 7 links the empirical
evidence to the theory, and Section 8 concludes the paper.
                                                                                                                                                  
9 Stehle (1994, 1995) provides evidence on the relation between capital structure and the cost of capital of
German stock corporations, Bähr/Janz (1994) and Gehrke (1994) study Tobin’s q and corporate investment in
Germany.
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1. Investment Decisions, Financing Decisions, and Firm Value in Germany and the
US
In a recent article, Fama and French (1998) provide a new approach to explain how
investment and financing decisions affect firm value.10 In order to present evidence on
the value added from investment decisions, they use year-by-year Fama-MacBeth
(FM, 1973) regressions to explain differences across US companies in the spread of
value over cost, Vt-At (market value minus book value of a firm’s total assets), and the
biannual change in this spread. Their approach provides a good tool to investigate if
substantial cross-national differences in the interaction of investment and financing
patterns exist. I also allows to address to the following questions:
(i)  Do companies in the German financial system perform better or worse than their
American counterparts in making value-enhancing investments?
(ii)  Are different dominant financing and dividend strategies in different countries
eminent?
Although these questions appear to be very ambitious, obtaining partial results
are certainly worth making the effort for. In short, with some exceptions, most of the
findings are rather similar to those found by Fama and French (FF, 1998).
The aim of this paper to compare my results for German firms with those of FF
for US ones requires that the methodology employed follows FF,as far as it is possible
and meaningful. Some more sophisticated regression techniques are applied to test the
robustness of my results. The paper concentrates on distinct characteristics and
differences between the American and German data sets and, most importantly, on the
interpretation of these results.
2. Data Description and Sample Selection
The original sample is divided into two time periods (1967-84 and 1985-91) because
the German Accounting Directives Law changed in 1985.  Results from a previous
study covering the time period 1985-91 are partially reported.
                                               
10 Their article is based on an earlier working paper „Investment Decisions, Financing Decisions, and Firm
Value“ (1996) on which this paper draws.
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The Data for this project, covering the period 1967-84, were mainly taken from
a database that was formerly used by Gehrke (1994).11 It contains financial accounting
data from unconsolidated statements (Einzelabschlüsse) and stock market data on 90%
of all industrial stock corporations that were publicly listed in Germany from 1967 to
1984. Market values of equity for the German companies were obtained from the
Hoppenstedt Stock Guide (Börsenführer). The financial accounting data for the
previous project covering the subsequent time period from 1985 to 1991 were obtained
from COMPUSTAT Global Vantage Industrial/Commercial (I/C) File, an international
database, which reports figures from consolidated statements (Konzernabschlüsse).
Fama and French (1996 and 1998), in their study use data on US-GAAP consolidated
staments from the time period 1965 to 1992 (28 Years) provided by the COMPUSTAT
Industrial Database. Surprising or not, for the German data it finally comes out that the
choice between consolidated or unconsolidated statements does not at all change the
results of the regression analysis.
To be included in the cross-section regressions for year t, a firm must have data
available on all variables for the three consecutive years t to t+2. Under this
requirement, the sample size for the level regressions ranges from 124 (in 1967) to 479
companies (in 1968), on average 400 firms each year. In the previous study, the sample
size for the level regressions ranges from 82 (in 1985) to 134 companies (in 1991), on
average 100 firms each year. Although seemingly small compared to the 1883 firms
(1967) and firms 4180 (1991) in the FF sample, the number of 7200 observations in
1967-84 is reasonably good, given that there are far less stock listed companies in
Germany and that German disclosure requirements and the data availability of annual
reports for empirical research in finance are much better in the US. Particularly
American researchers therefore tend to argue that the results of such comparative tests
are somehow being driven by accounting differences in US and German GAAP.
However, Harris, Lang, and Möller (1993) come to the conclusion that accounting data
for German corporations “are significantly associated with stock price levels and
                                               
11 Norman Gehrke (1994) created this database for his dissertation. It is originally based on data drawn from
Hoppenstedt German Stock Guide, from the „Deutsche Finanzdatenbank“, Aachen, provided by Prof. Hans
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returns”. They find that the explanatory power is at least comparable to that in the
United States.12 This will be verified by the following study.
3. Cross-Sectional Regression Methodology
Event studies are the most popular empirical method from which to draw inferences
about the effects of investment and financing decisions.13 As FF point out, however,
event studies face problems that cross-section regressions can overcome: “[B]ecause
the regressions examine the cumulative effects of longer-term (two-year) changes in
financing decisions, the observed value effects are larger and more reliable than those
of event studies.  Moreover, because the regressions control for earnings, dividends,
debt, and investment, they better expose the richness of the information about value in
investment and financing decisions.”
Fama-Macbeth regressions involve a series of year-by-year cross-sectional least
squares (LS) regressions of the spread of value over cost on one or more explanatory
variables that are assumed to be driving factors of investment and financing decisions.
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where T is the number of years, Rt is the number of firms (“records”) in year t, (Vj,t-
Aj,t)/Aj,t is the spread of value over cost of firm j in year t (scaled by the book value of
total assets Aj,t), F is the number of explanatory variables, Xi,j,t is the realization of
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Peter Möller, and from data at the Institute of Banking and Finance at the Humboldt-University, Berlin. I am
grateful to Prof. Richard Stehle for giving me the opportunity to make use of this unique data set.
12 Trevor Harris, Mark Lang, and Hans Peter Möller. The Value Relevance of German Accounting Measures:
An Empirical Analysis. Journal of Accounting Research 32, 1994, 187-209.
13 Event studies are empirical tests for abnormal stock returns during a period surrounding the announcement
of identifiable events, such as securities issues (financing decisions), capital expenditures (investment
decisions), dividend changes, and so on. See Brown and Warner (1985), Marais and Schipper (1995), or
Campbell/Lo/MacKinlay (1996) for comprehensive introductions to event study methodology.
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i.e., the null hypothesis states that the time-series average of the year-by-year
regression slopes is 0. The statistical significance is conducted by a one-sample t-test
that assumes normality and identical independent distribution (i.i.d.) of the regression
slopes. The time-series means of the slope coefficients are divided by their standard
errors and then multiplied by the square root of the number of observations (T -1):
 Following from the central limit theorem, this t-statistic is approximately robust with
respect to deviations from normality, depending on the sample size and possible
outliers in the data.14
Fama (1978) claims that the common goal of investment and financing
decisions is to maximize the difference between total firm value and cost. Based on
this assumption, firm value is best defined as Vt-At, the spread of total market value
over the replacement cost of the assets, the assets being necessary to generate that
market value. Since replacement cost is hard to calculate, it is proxied by the book
value of total assets. The market value of debt is proxied by book value of total
liabilities, information that can be obtained from financial statement data items. In
order to allow comparisons across firms without overemphasizing the effect of very
large firms, the firm value is scaled by the book value of total assets, At. The scaling
should also weaken biases introduced by heteroscedasticity. Finally, using relative
rather than absolute values allows us to ignore inflation influences.
To examine the effects of investment and financing decisions on firm value in
Germany, the following cross-section FM regressions are run:15
(1)  (Vt-At)/At = a0 + a1Et/At + a2(Et+2-Et)/At + a3(At+2-At)/At + a4(Vt+2-Vt) /At
+ a5It/At + a6(It+2/At+2-It/At) + a7Dt/At + a8(Dt+2/At+2-Dt/At) + et
= a0 + a1Et/At + a2dEt/At + a3dAt/At + a4dVt/At + a5It/At + a6d(It/At)
+ a7Dt/At + a8d(Dt/At) + et
                                               













(2)  (Vt-At)/At = a0 + a1Et/At + a2dEt/At + a3dAt/At + a4dVt/At + a5It/At + a6dIt/At
+ a7Dt/At + a8dDt/At + et
where Et is earnings before interest and after taxes in year t; It is interest
expense for the fiscal year t; Dt is total dividends paid in year t; dXt/At is the biannual
change in variable Xt scaled by total assets in year t, (Xt+2-Xt)/At; and d(Xt/At) are the
biannual changes in the ratio (Xt+2/At+2-Xt/At). For example, dVt/At is the two-year
change in the market value of the firm scaled by the book value of total assets.
The proxy for expected investment, dAt/At, seems a crude measure, but given
the empirical problems in calculating comparable figures for corporate investment
from German annual reports, it is not too crude as an approximation. It/At, the interest
expense to assets, is used as a direct measure of book leverage. Even though it is
problematic to make national comparisons on the basis of It/At, because the level of
interest rates and the market conditions for debt financing may differ significantly
across countries, It/At serves as a good explanatory variable for leverage effects on
firm value in cross-sectional regressions.16 Changes in absolute leverage or the level of
interest expenses are consequently proxied by dIt/At, whereas expected changes in
leverage policy are captured by d(It/At). Equivalently, dividend policy is measured by
Dt/At, expected changes in dividend policy are proxied by d(Dt/At), and expected
dividend changes in absolute terms are captured by dDt/At.
The two-year change in the market value of equity, dVt/At, is included in the
regressions as a measurement error (MSE) proxy, in order to account for the fact that
expected (ex ante) changes in assets, earnings, dividends, and leverage are proxied by
the respective realized (ex post) changes dAt, dEt, dDt, and dIt. Unexpected changes in
these variables cannot by definition affect firm value in period t, and therefore have no
                                                                                                                                                  
15 Henceforth, the correct firm subscript j on all variables and the year subscript t on the regression coefficients
will be dropped in favour of simplicity.
16 The huge coefficients and t-values on the It variables  in the regressions will show this. dIt/At is also a direct
measure of leverage, that is not subject to the problem of correctly measuring different instruments of debt
financing in various countries.
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effect on (Vt-At)/At. This leads to an errors-in-variables problem.
17 Kothari and
Shanken (1992) suggest to include MSE proxies in the regression model as these ex
post variables include the effects of unexpected changes.
In regressions (3) and (4) the dependent variable is the biannual change in the spread
of value over cost, d(Vt-At)/At= [(Vt+2-At+2)-(Vt-At)]/At, which is regressed on the
biannual change versions of the previous explanatory variables. The intuition behind
regressions (3) and (4) is that they capture the biannual change, respectively, of
regressions (1) and (2).
(3)  d(Vt-At)/At = a0 + a1dEt/At + a2dEt+2/At + a3dAt/At + a4dAt+2/At + a5dVt+2/At
+ a6d(It/At) + a7d(It+2/At+2) + a8d(Dt/At) + a9d(Dt+2/At+2) + et+2
(4)  d(Vt-At)/At = a0 + a1dEt/At + a2dEt+2/At + a3dAt/At + a4dAt+2/At + a5dVt+2/At
+ a6dIt/At + a7dIt+2/At + a8dDt/At + a9dDt+2/At + et+2
To be included in these regressions for fiscal year t, a firm must provide data on
all the relevant variables for five consecutive years until the year t+4. This data
requirement is more restrictive than in regressions (1) and (2) which only required
observations on three consecutive years. Thus, the sample size is smaller in regressions
(3) and (4).
4. Summary Statistics
4.1 Correlations of the Regression Variables
Table 1 shows the average correlations of the regression variables on which the initial
comparative analysis is based.
Similar to the findings by FF for the US sample, positive correlations between the level
of earnings Et/At (0.21) as well as the two-year change in earnings dEt/At (0.03) and the
spread of value over cost (Vt-At)/At exist. In Germany, profitability -- proxied by
reported earnings -- is a driving factor of firm value. Also in line with the FF results,
                                               
17 For a general overview on regressions with errors in variables see Casella and Berger (1990), pp. 581-583.
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the level of dividends Dt/At (0.42) and the two-year future change in dividends dDt/At
(0.04) are more highly correlated with (Vt-At)/At than are earnings. The other
correlations, too, are strikingly similar to those reported by FF, especially as far as
positive or negative signs are concerned. A noteworthy exception is the positive
correlation of the ratio of interest to assets It/At with Et/At (0.04 in Germany compared
to -0.13 in the US). Also, the correlation of the biannual change variables d(It/At) and
dEt/At is 0.01 in Germany and -0.10 in the US. Higher leverage -- proxied by It/At -- is
also more strongly correlated with lower spread of firm value over cost in Germany
than in the US (-0.18 versus -0.09). In both countries, the biannual future change in
leverage d(It/At) is positively correlated with the future change in debt dIt/At (0.67
versus 0.46 in the US). The FF proposition that for US firms this negative relation
between leverage and (Vt-At)/At is linked to the negative correlation between It/At and
Et/At cannot be applied to the German data set where the two correlations have
opposite signs.
The Kothari-Shanken (1992) argument, cited by FF, holds in Germany as well as in the
US.18 The correlations of dVt/At with biannual changes from t to t+2 in earnings (0.20),
dividends (0.22), and interest expense (0.46) are positive, but the slopes on dVt/At to
explain (Vt-At)/At in the full regressions are all negative, and more than 2.2 standard
errors from 0. The future two-year change in value, therefore, seems to remove
unexpected components from the future changes in other variables.
The negative correlation of the two-year future change in dividend policy
d(Dt/At) with (Vt-At)/At (-0.05) and with Et/At (-0.12) is not a replica of the FF sample
(0.00 and 0.01, respectively). The slope on d(Dt/At) in the full regressions is strongly
positive (4.64) and more than 3.3 standard errors from 0. Thus, (biannual) future
increases in dividend policy seem to be observed after periods of poor profitability in
Germany but not in the US. However, controlling for the level of earnings and the
level of dividends, a future increase in dividend policy has a positive impact on the
spread of value over cost in both countries, although for the US data the coefficient is
only weakly significant.
                                               
18 See explanation above.
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4.2 The Level of the Dependent and Independent Variables
Do the effects of a firm’s value on investment and financing decisions differ for
different types of firms in Germany and the US? Table 2 shows the means of the
dependent and independent variables for the German sample, with the firms sorted by
size into two groups and by book-to-market-equity (BE/ME) into another two groups.
Since no CRSP tapes nor BE/ME breakdown values by size are available for German
stock companies, the firms are simply divided according to their own reported figures
into groups of equal size each year. Nevertheless, even this simple sorting procedure
results in clear patterns. For the cross-country comparisons, the data are averaged from
the FF sample across the same 18 sample years (t=1967-84).
Are investment decisions more effective in the US than in Germany? The
simple average of (Vt-At)/At is 0.501 for US firms, compared to 0.460 for German
firms. On the other hand, the simple regressions reveal that a $1 increase in assets
between t and t+2 adds between $.57 and $.77 to the spread of value over cost in the
US, between 1967 and 1984 (not reported), whereas a DM 1.00 biannual increase in
assets seems to add only DM 0.43 to (Vt-At)/At. A first guess leads to the conclusion
that investment drives value in the US, whereas value quite possibly drives investment
in Germany. The average growth rate of assets dAt/At – our proxy for corporate
investment -- is also much higher in the US (0.340) than in Germany (0.158), but in
both countries investment rates are higher for low-BE/ME than for high-BE/ME firms.
The average level of earnings (reported before interest and after taxes) Et/At for
all size-BE/ME groups in Germany (All=0.042) is drastically lower than the
corresponding level in the US (0.077), which may be attributed to the assumed
conservatism in German accounting. It also supports HLM (1994), who, by matching
two samples for 1981 to 1990, one consisting of 230 German firms and one of 230 US
firms, find that earnings-divided-by-equity are significantly lower in Germany than in
the US. However, the average level ETt/At (0.080) and the average biannual growth
rate dETt/At (0.010) double when earnings are measured before taxes, in Germany but
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not in the US.19 The standard deviations of the level (growth rate) of earnings over
time also increase(s) from .758% to .840% (.933% to 6.240% respectively) when
German firm’s earnings are measured before instead after taxes. This leads to the
following conclusion: German firms substantially decrease reported earnings through
discretionary accounting techniques in order to minimize corporate income tax, which
is based on reported earnings. By doing so, they also smooth earnings over time and
minimize variation in earnings after taxes in order to report constant earnings figures
without the threat of bad news surprises. Furthermore, the average growth of earnings
dEt/At is much higher in the US (0.027) than in Germany (0.005). Yet, low-BE/ME
firms (S/L and B/L) display significantly higher dEt/At ratios than do high-BE/ME
firms (S/H and B/H) in Germany. In other words, separating stronger from weaker
firms on BE/ME works in Germany as well as in the US.
Dividends show other patterns. Overall, the ratio of dividends to assets Dt/At
does not differ much between Germany (0.018) and the US (0.017).20 In both
countries, low-BE/ME firms pay much more dividends than do high-BE/ME firms. As
in the US, big German firms pay on average more dividends than do small firms, so
that large low-BE/ME firms pay out the highest dividends relative to their assets in
both countries. All German firms experience modest growth in dividends dDt/At
(0.002) compared to their US counterparts (0.004).
Contrary to the conventional view that debt is the dominant source of financing
in Germany, the firms in our sample are even slightly less levered than their American
counterparts, when the ratio of interest expense to assets It/At is used as the relevant
measure (0.021 vs. 0.022). This evidence is supported by Rajan and Zingales (1995)
who – by using different adjusted measures of leverage -- find that across the G-7
countries German firms are relatively less levered.21 However, given that German
firms finance themselves more through directly placed bank loans and much less
                                               
19 The corresponding average earnings before taxes for the US sample are ETt/At = .121 (+57% compared to
earnings after taxes) and dETt/At =.040 (+48%).
20 The slightly higher dividend payout ratio in Germany could be attributed to the fact that there is no double
taxation of dividends like in the US.
21 Their basic measure is the ratio of total debt to capital (debt + equity). However, they also adjust for cash
balances, pension liabilities, deferred taxes, goodwill, intangibles, and provisions. Even after these adjustments,
the German median ratio of debt to capital remains the lowest of all G-7 countries.
14
through marketable securities (Allen/Gale, 1995), an explanation of the lower It/At
could be that these bank loans provide better conditions, i.e., on average lower interest
rates due to the benefits of financial intermediation and closer relationships between
banks and firms in Germany. However, in a study on the structure of the German
banking system, Edwards and Fischer (1994) find no evidence of lower cost of bank-
supplied debt in Germany than in market-based systems.22 Another explanation is that
American listed stock companies are indeed a bit more levered than are German listed
stock companies, but mainly through the use of bond financing. The average growth of
interest expense dIt/At is higher for small firms than for big firms in both countries. A
third interpretation of the differences in the leverage proxy is that I/A is simply not a
good measure to use in international comparisons, because it is affected by national
accounting definitions of interest expense as well as by varying interest rates. Despite
these problems it remains a good variable to capture level and changes in the leverage
policy of firms.23
5. Regression Results
5.1 Earnings and Dividends
In the simple regressions of Table 3, the spread of value over cost has a strong positive
effect on earnings (before and after taxes) and dividends, and negative slopes on the
two-year change in value. The average slopes on Et/At (4.48) and dEt/At (1.75) are 6.5
and 3.2 standard errors from 0. The coefficients on the level of dividends Dt/At are
huge (>16.6) and more than 7.8 standard errors from 0. The future change in dividends
dDt/At (5.93, t=3.1) and the two-year change in dividend policy d(Dt/At) (6.11, t=4.0)
also have power to explain (Vt-At)/At when Dt/At and dVt/At are included in the
regressions. The current coefficients on changes in earnings dEt/At, dividends dDt/At,
and dividend policy d(Dt/At) have significantly positive slopes on d(Vt-At)/At, the two-
year change of the spread of value over cost. Changes in dividends dDt/At and dividend
                                               
22 They compare bank loans conditions in Germany to those in the United Kingdom.
23 In the regression analysis, I also use book leverage instead of the interest expense to assets as an explanatory
variable. Nevertheless, it does not at all change the results.
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policy d(Dt/At) still have explanatory power in the full regressions (1) and (2), and are
more than 2.7 and 3.1 standard errors from 0.
In the full regressions of Table 4.a the average slopes of the coefficient on
earnings after taxes, Et/At, lose significance. However, when earnings are measured
before taxes, the slopes on ETt/At are still positive and more than 5.2 standard errors
from 0.0 in the full regressions. Thus, in Germany there is explanatory power in the
future change in earnings before (but not after) taxes that is not absorbed by
information in dividends or other variables. In contrast, the level of earnings and the
future change in earnings lose all explanatory power in the corresponding FF
regressions for the US: Across the observation period (1967-84), none of the Et/At and
dEt/At coefficients are significant. The high and persistent explanatory power of
earnings variables in the German sample is consistent with the conclusion of HLM
(1994) that due to the relative conservatism in German accounting “coefficients linking
the stock price return or level to a given level of earnings or shareholders’ equity are
generally larger in Germany than in the United States.” It is remarkable, though, that
only earnings before taxes still have explanatory power when all other proxy variables
are included in the regressions. Reported earnings from unconsolidated annual
statements (“Einzelabschlüsse”) not only are the basis for corporate income taxation in
Germany, they also tie corporate management to a certain dividend payout ratio.24
Therefore, income smoothing through discretionary accounting management may be
quite possibly the explanation for this observation. This would also explain why the
coefficients on dETt/At  (0.41) are more than ten times higher than the coefficients on
dEt/At (0.01), although both variables are not statistically different from 0 in the full
regressions.
                                               
24 As HLM (1994) point out: “[German] Stock Corporation Law prevents management from retaining more
than half of (legal-entity) net income for the year, leaving disposition of the remaining (unappropriated) profit
and certain retained earnings to the discretion of shareholders at the annual meeting. This [...] creates
incentives to manage reported earnings [...] because higher reported earnings may create shareholder pressure
for higher dividends.“
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5.2 Debt and Leverage
Leverage, It/At, is strongly negatively related to the spread of value over cost, the
coefficients’ standard errors being more than 6.2 standard errors from zero in the
simple regressions. On the other hand, changes in interest expense, are positively
correlated with changes in earnings (0.23) and changes in investment (0.63). While the
coefficients on the biannual change in leverage d(It/At) are always negative, the
coefficient on dIt/At  is positive (although not significant) in the simple regressions, but
switches to weakly negative when we control for profitability, investment, and
dividends in the full regressions. Also, in the simple change regressions of Table 3 the
corresponding coefficient on dIt+2/At (3.21) is significantly positive, while losing
significance in regression (4).
Thus, German firms seem to invest more when earnings growth is strong and partly
have to finance this investment with debt, leading to higher interest expenses. A
possible interpretation is that they involuntarily have to finance growth with debt, due
to the lack of other external funds. Under this scenario, more debt contains positive
information about profitability. Consequently, this debt financing of corporate growth
is associated with increases in leverage, as evidenced by the high correlation of d(It/At)
and dIt/At (0.67) – much higher than in the US (0.46).
25 The story seems especially
likely for small low-BE/ME firms which on average have the largest change in interest
expense, dIt/At (0.005). Bigger firms are less levered and on average have lower dIt/At
and d(It/At). This is consistent with the commonly held view that small firms in
Germany face heavy constraints when it comes to financing corporate growth.
The negative coefficients on It/At lose much of their explanatory power when
earnings, dividends, and investment are included in the full regressions. They are still
negative (-1.83 to –2.52) but merely 1.8 to 2.1 standard errors from 0 and hence only
weakly significant. The same pattern is observed for the US by FF (1998) who “infer
that the stronger negative relations between leverage and value in the single-variable
regressions are due to the negative correlations of leverage with the proxies for
                                               
25 In a parallel study conducted for the time period 1985-91 we also find a high correlation between d(It/At) and
dIt/At of 0.72. This sample contains fewer firms and uses consolidated statements, though.
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profitability.” Regardless of the type of financial system, it is the information content
of debt that seems to have a negative impact on firm value.
5.3 Investment Decisions
What can be said on the effectiveness of investment decisions in Germany and the US?
Following the arguments of FF, on average, investment generates value in excess of
cost in both countries, a statement that is not entirely supported by the German data.
The estimates of the regressions (1) and (2) in Table 4.a provide (only weak) evidence
that a DM 1.00 expected increase in assets from t to t+2 adds between DM 0.43 and
DM 0.38 to the spread of value over cost when controlling for profits and other
variables. This is less than the corresponding American values (1.00 to 0.79) obtained
from the FF sample, which also have much higher statistical significance (more than 5
standard errors from 0) in the same time period, from 1967 to 1984. The coefficients
on dAt/At in the regressions (3) and (4) for Germany are close to 0, the coefficient on
another investment variable, namely the change in assets from t+2 to t+4, dAt+2/At, is
significantly positive (0.33, t=3.0). Thus, since there is a positive relation between the
spread of value over cost and dAt/At, and between the two-year change in the spread
and dAt+2/At, we can carefully suggest a net market value in excess of cost for
investment decisions in Germany. However, the coefficient on the investment proxy
dAt/At (0.43) in the simple regression is almost the same as in the full regressions (a
pattern not observed in the US where the slopes tend to become smaller when other
variables are included). Since the results are not that straightforward, one might
suppose that dAt/At is indeed a noisy measure for corporate investment. Therefore, we
alternatively used net capital investments (inv) in t=1 to t=2 as an explanatory variable
instead of dAt/At in the simple regressions. With a coefficient on inv/At of 0.11
(t=1.24) the results are even less significant.
Does the data on the spread of value over cost support the hypothesis that, on
average, German firms undertake less profitable investments than their American
counterparts? From 1967 to 1984, the average value of (Vt-At)/At is 0.460 in Germany
compared to 0.501 in the US, and between 1985 and 1991, 0.451 and 0.834,
respectively. Taken at face value, these equally-weighted figures suggest, on average,
18
less profitable investments for the sample of German firms. Calculating the ratios of
aggregates provides us with value-weighted results. If the spread of value over cost is
estimated per deutschmark of total assets of all firms by summing (Vt-At) across firms
and then dividing by the sum of At, it yields a ratio of only 0.256 (0.14) across the
years 1967-84 (1985-91).26 For 1991, the ratio is 0.144 compared to 0.212 for the FF
sample of American firms. When firms are value-weighted, the difference between
both countries gets smaller but is still impressive. If these ratios are measures of “the
effectiveness of resource allocation decisions of the publicly traded corporate sector of
economies”27, then German firms fall far behind. This is especially true for high-
BE/ME firms whose ratios of aggregate (Vt-At) to aggregate At are much lower than
those of low-BE/ME firms, a pattern also to be observed in the US data. However, the
fact that (Vt-At)/At is higher for firms sorted into the low-BE/ME category is a
tautology for both Germany and the US. The ratio BE/ME expanded with total
liabilities more or less equals At/Vt, which is 1/[(Vt-At)/At]+1, an algebraically
different version of the dependent variable itself. 28
Controlling for earnings, dividends and financing decisions, corporate investment still
has significant explanatory power to explain the spread of value over cost in the US
but not in Germany. Overall it appears that a lot of German firms’ investment activity
in the sample period is driven by value rather than by value creation, i.e., big firms
invest a lot, regardless of profitability.29
                                               
26 This ratio is computed over all firms (ΣVi-ΣAi )/Σ Ai , i = 1,…, R.
27 Fama and French (1996) p. 30.
28 This is due to the fact that there are no market values of liabilities on the Compustat tapes and we are only
using book values as approximations. Therefore, we have Vt/At = (market value of debt + book value of
liabilities) / total book assets, which is an expanded version of the ratio ME/BE. This is a general weakness of
the FF approach. However, since BE/ME is used only as a sorting device for the descriptive statistics and not as
an explanatory variable in the regressions, it does not corrupt the results.
29 FF note that under rational pricing and a perfect control for expected profits, the relation between investment
and the spread of value over cost should be negative: holding profits fixed, an increase in assets implies a
roughly one-for-one decline in the spread.  Contrary though, the coefficients on dAt/At and dAt+2/At in the full
regressions are all positive and significantly different from -1.0. For the US, FF correctly infer that “the
earnings and financing variables in the full regressions do not produce a perfect control for expected profits,
and investment picks up some of the information they miss. “
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6. Robust Statistical Methods
LS regressions -- like the cross-section FM method -- are sensitive to outliers in the
data. Outliers are sample values which deviate from the majority of the sample, for
example due to extreme observations or errors in the original data. This can be
illustrated by introducing the concept of the breakdown value (bv) of an estimator,
which is the proportion m/R of a sample S that can be moved to infinity without the
estimator θ moving to infinity (Hampel, 1974). It is formally given by
bv(θ, S) = min {m/Rsuch that b(m; θ, S) = ∞}
where b(m; θ, S) is the maximum bias that can be obtained by replacing m of the R
sample points by arbitrarily large outliers. The breakdown value is thus an indicator of
the (in)sensitivity of an estimator to underlying assumptions about the distribution. For
example, the breakdown value for the mean is 0%, i.e., the mean can be completely
corrupted by one single outlier, whereas the breakdown value for the median is 50%.
The breakdown value of the LS estimator is given by bv(θ, S) = 1/R ≈ 0%. Thus, one
single data point can cause the regression to break down. Venables and Ripley (1994)
give several reasons why screening data and deleting outliers alone is ineffective in
these cases:
• Even expert statisticians are not always able to screen the data.
• Down-weighting observations is preferable to completely rejecting them.
• It is very difficult to spot outliers in multivariate or highly structured data.
• Rejecting outliers conflicts with the underlying distribution theory by interfering
with the iid requirement necessary for the sample selection process.
• If the outliers are leverage points, they cannot be uncovered by examining the
residuals.30
6.1 Robust Fama-Macbeth Regressions
In a recent article Knez and Ready (1997) present a robust FM least trimmed squares
regression (LTS) technique that has high breakdown values and is robust against
20
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2 ) R  are ordered squared residuals and  a  is a
parameter vector of length p and q ≤ R. The scalar q over which the sum is taken
depends on the trimmed portion α of the sample:
q = [R(1-α)] + [α(p+1)]
The highest possible breakdown value for the LTS estimator is given by ([(R-
p)/2] +1)/R which is approximately 50%. It can be achieved by choosing α = 0.5
which sets q = [R/2] + [(p+1)/2].
Trimming half of the sample is done to see if the previous LS regression results
are confirmed under robust conditions. For this purpose, the LTSREG function in S-
PLUS is used which returns a regression estimate by minimizing the sum of the
smallest half of the squared residuals. It can only generate an approximation to the true
solution based on a genetic algorithm, developed by Burns (1992).31 Hence, the
regression results are not exactly reproducible, though the differences are negligible.
Nevertheless, they are supporting the results of the initial regressions.
6.2 Robust Regression Results
By trimming half of the sample one would intuitively expect dramatic differences
between the simple LS and the LTS estimators, particularly, as a trade-off exists
between trimming as many outliers as possible and maintaining a sufficient amount of
                                                                                                                                                  
30 Knez and Ready (1997) point out that “[a] leverage point only has the potential to exert a large influence on
the regression coefficients. For some observations, the x-values may be outliers in the x direction but, because
of the associated y-values the observed points lie close to the regression line determined by the rest of the data.”
31 The exact procedure is described in the S-PLUS User’s Manual (Statistical Sciences, 1993): “The objective
that least trimmed squares minimizes is the sum of the q smallest squared residuals. Individual solutions are
defined by a set of observation numbers, which corresponds to a least squares fit with the specified
observations. A stock of popsize individuals is produced by random sampling, then a number of random
samples are taken and the best solutions are saved in the stock. During the genetic phase, two parents are
picked which produce an offspring that contains a sample of the observations from the parents. The best two
out of the three are retained in the stock. The best of all of the solutions found is used to compute the
coefficients and the residuals.”
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degrees of freedom. Hence, some of the original LS estimators gain in significance
while others become insignificant when the LTS regressions are run.
However, none of the main conclusions changes. With one exception, none of
the coefficients in the level regressions switches signs. Overall, the coefficients
become smaller but most the t-values gain in significance, as was expected given that
outliers had been accounted for. For example, the coefficient of (Vt-At)/At on dAt/At
drops from 0.43 to 0.38 (whereas the corresponding t-value increases from 2.23 to
3.16); the coefficient on Dt/At drops from 16.67 to 10.19 and the t-value rises from
7.87 to 13.56; and the coefficient on Et/At is halved from 4.48 to 2.10 with the t-value
increasing from 6.59 to 4.53. These deviations only show that the interactions between
investment, finance, and firm value are much stronger for some firms than for the
majority of the sample. The main conclusions remain the same.
7. Empirical Results and Theory
How well do these empirical results fit the theories of capital structure and dividend
decisions? Fama/French (1996) and Harris/Raviv (1991) provide some excellent
discussions of theory and ist evidence. Therefore, this section will simply provide a
very general overview of the topics, as displayed in Panels 1 and 2. The two panels
categorize but do not analyze the most important literature. However, the list of
references is far from complete. The panels also serve as a summary of the empirical



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In 1991, a dollar of assets invested in a public stock company in the United States
generated $1.21 in value whereas a deutschmark invested in German stock companies
generated only DM 1.14 on average. This discrepancy widens if we take into account
that only industrial and commercial firms but no banks or insurance companies are
found in the Global Vantage I/C File. When FF drop these “competitive service
industries” from their sample, their average value added per dollar rises.
The question is whether this is an operational benchmark for the effectiveness
of investment decisions either country. Yes and no. One interpretation of small spreads
of value over cost is that economic activity in a country is highly competitive. It is
highly doubtful that this is a reasonable explanation for the differences in the spreads
between the two countries. One problem with using my results and those by FF to
compare firm behavior in the two countries is that the respective sample sizes differ.
There are far more firms in the FF sample than in the sample of German firms.
Nonetheless, the evidence of the effects of earnings, dividends, and investment on firm
value shows parallel patterns in both countries, a phenomenon that cannot be explained
solely by data snooping. LTS regressions according to the “robust” Fama-MacBeth
procedure by Knez and Ready (1997) do not seem not to affect qualitative results,
either. Yet, the value added of the German economy as a whole is unlikely to be that
inferior to that of the US economy. I will provide two interpretations that might throw
some light on this issue.
First, the market value of shares of domestic companies as a percentage of GDP
is only 20.3% in Germany compared to 77.3% in the US (Allen and Gale, 1994).
Therefore, most of the investment activity that is going on in Germany is not reflected
in the stock market, a phenomenon portrayed by the smaller size of the sample of
German stock companies. Hence, the current study covers only a small part of the
German economy, while FF is likely to capture most of the corporate activity in the
US. Thus, the German sample is heavily biased towards big publicly quoted
companies. The renownedly successful German small and middle-sized companies
which are likely to produce most of the value added in the economy are not included in
the sample. This privacy of a lot of corporate activity is also a very own characteristic
26
of the German financial system. Secondly, “maximizing shareholder value” has not
always been the main objective for corporations in Germany. Traditionally, social
consensus between stakeholders has been a guideline of corporate governance in
Germany. For example, between one third and one half of the directors of the
supervisory board in German companies are appointed by the employees. This ensures
that a good part of the value added is not distributed to shareholders but rather to
company employees, in the form of wages, social benefits, and job security. This share
of the value added is not reflected in a company’s stock price. However, at the margin
investment decisions in Germany seem to generate less value. It can be argued if this is
due to the corporate governance system or to other factors, such as capital
productivity. As we have seen, even with an identical empirical methodology, it is
difficult to make reliable comparative statements on investment, earnings and dividend










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3a – Average coefficients and their t-statistics from simple level regressions
to explain (Vt-At) and d(Vt-At)/At
The variables are defined in table 1. ETt is earnings before taxes (Ett plus tax
expense). The cross-section regressions use investment, or earnings, or interest or
dividends, along with a future change in value, as explanatory variables. The
regressions are run for each year t using all German firms with data available for
the year on all variables in the level regressions or the change regressions. The
table shows means (across years) of the regression intercepts (Int) and slopes,
and t-statistics for the means (means divided by their standard errors times the
square root of the number of observations/years). The time period for the level
regressions is t=1967-84, T=18.
Dependent is (Vt-At)/At
Int dAt/At dVt/At
Mean 0.40 0.43 -0.29 Investment
t(mean) 10.12 2.23 -1.98
Int Et/At dEt/At dVt/At
Mean 0.26 4.48 1.75 -0.19 EBI
t(mean) 5.74 6.59 3.22 -1.81
Int ETt/At dETt/At dVt/At
Mean 0.12 4.14 1.53 -0.21 EBIT
t(mean) 4.54 8.41 3.33 -2.05
Int It/At dIt/At dVt/At
Mean 0.63 -8.99 2.18 -0.10 Leverage
t(mean) 9.39 -8.17 0.76 -0.86
Int It/At d(It/At) dVt/At
Mean 0.63 -10.16 -4.76 -0.15 Leverage Policy
t(mean) 7.75 -6.23 -2.20 -1.53
Int Dt/At dDt/At dVt/At
Mean 0.17 16.67 5.93 -0.18 Dividends
t(mean) 6.10 7.87 3.19 -1.85
Int Dt/At d(Dt/At) dVt/At
Mean 0.17 17.35 6.11 -0.16 Dividend Policy










































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4a – Average coefficients and their t-statistics from estimates of the full regressions
(1) and (2)
Dependent Variable Is (Vt-At)/At
Int Et/At dEt/At dAt/At dVt/At It/At d(It/At) Dt/At d(Dt/At)
Mean 0.17 0.40 0.01 0.38 -0.33 -2.16 -1.36 14.70 4,80
t(Mean) 3.68 1.20 0.03 2.49 -2.45 -1.87 -1,09 7,93 3.76
Mean 0.09 0.48 0.21 0.79 -0.25 -3.84 -1.19 10.53 2.78
t(Mean) 0.87 0.36 0.43 5.06 -2.43 -2.33 -1.13 7.81 1.97
Int ETt/At dETt/At dAt/At dVt/At It/At d(It/At) Dt/At d(Dt/At)
Mean 0.12 1.44 0.41 0.42 -0.34 -2,32 -0,86 12.57 4.64
t(Mean) 2.83 6.33 1.91 2.47 -2.54 -2,12 -0,82 7.09 3.32
Mean 0.04 0.80 0.49 -0.26 0.75 -2.78 0.14 8.34 1.51
t(Mean) 0.33 0.89 1.38 -2.53 4.93 -2.25 0.13 5.48 1.05
Int Et/At dEt/At dAt/At dVt/At It/At dIt/At Dt/At dDt/At
Mean 0.18 0.42 0.03 0.43 -0.33 -2.23 -1.44 14.60 5.16
t(Mean) 3.85 1.22 0.11 2.78 -2.46 -2.06 -1.25 7.91 4.52
Mean 0.09 0.02 -0.15 1.00 -0.26 -3.28 -6.40 10.43 6.82
t(Mean) 0.97 0.02 -0.34 5.44 -2.57 -2.15 -3.74 8.64 7.15
Int ETt/At dETt/At dAt/At dVt/At It/At dIt/At Dt/At dDt/At
Mean 0.13 1.38 0.34 0.38 -0.53 -2.52 -1.23 12.04 3.68
t(Mean) 2.91 5.23 1.58 2.47 -2.22 -1.15 -1.15 7.01 2.78
Mean 0.05 0.50 0.20 0.93 -0.27 -2.68 -5.24 8.59 5.42
t(Mean) 0.50 0.60 0.61 5.22 -2.63 -2.25 -3.51 6.57 7.15
The regressions are run for each year t using all German firms with data available for the
year on all variables in the level regressions. The table shows means (across years) of the
regression intercepts (Int) and slopes, and t-statistics for the means (means divided by
their standard errors times the square root of the number of observations/years T-1). The
time period for the level regressions is t=1967-84, N=18. Regression results from
Fama/French (1996) of their sample of US companies over the same time period are
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 6 – LTS (least trimmed squares) regressions to explain
(Vt-At) and d(Vt-At)/At
The LTS regressions use a trimming proportion of 50%, returning a regression estimate
that minimizes the sum of the smallest half of the squared residuals, in order to reject
outliers and to get a very resistant regression. The results shown here will not be exactly
reproducible, because the LTS method approximates the true solution based on a
random algorithm, hence different answers will result each time the same regression is
run. The table shows means (across years) of the regression intercepts (Int) and slopes,
and t-statistics for the means (means divided by their standard errors times the square
root of the number of observations/years). The time period for the regressions is
t=1967-84, T=18.
Dependent is (Vt-At)/At ... is d(Vt-At)/At=[(Vt+2-At+2)-(Vt-At)]/At
Int dAt/At dVt/At Int dAt/At dAt+2/At dVt+2/At
Mean 0.08 0.38 -0.30 0.01 0.08 0.14 -0.09
t(mean) 13.82 3.16 -2.50 0.71 2.17 2.45 -2.10
Int Et/At dEt/At dVt/At Int dEt/At dEt+2/At dVt+2/At
Mean 0.03 2.10 0.75 0.03 0.01 0.60 0.33 -0.02
t(mean) 1.95 4.53 3.11 1.08 0.90 2.77 1.37 -0.98
Int ETt/At dETt/At dVt/At Int dETt/At dETt+2/At dVt+2/At
Mean -0.01 2.06 0.49 -0.03 0.02 0.45 0.16 -0.03
t(mean) -0.49 6.80 4.04 -1.25 0.95 2.44 1.47 -1.81
Int It/At dIt/At dVt/At Int dIt/At dIt+2/At dVt+2/At
Mean 0.14 -1.63 -0.56 0.03 0.01 -0.92 0.33 0.01
t(mean) 10.36 -5.77 -0.67 0.98 0.61 -2.38 1.07 0.76
Int It/At d(It/At) dVt/At Int d(It/At) d(It+2/At+2) dVt+2/At
Mean 0.15 -1.94 -0.53 0.03 0.02 0.22 0.10 0.00
t(mean) 47,15 -22.88 -4.81 8,39 1.00 0.60 0.35 -0.25
Int Dt/At dDt/At dVt/At Int dDt/At dDt+2/At dVt+2/At
Mean 0.02 10.19 1.33 -0.03 0.01 5.02 0.80 -0.03
t(mean) 1.50 13.56 2.87 -0.81 0.46 3.85 1.51 -1.51
Int Dt/At d(Dt/At) dVt/At Int d(Dt/At) d(Dt+2/At+2) dVt+2/At
Mean 0.01 10.44 2.51 -0.00 0.02 4.65 -0.19 -0.02
t(mean) 1.11 12.23 2.88 -0.02 1.12 3.91 -0.33 -1.26
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